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No East Asian country is more important to the region’s future economic development 
prospects than Japan. Japan’s sheer economic weight ensures that it will inevitably 
exercise a major influence on its neighbors. Whether this role will prove to be as a 
beneficial engine of growth, or as a more malignant constraint on regional recovery is not 
clear. Much of difficulty of assessing Japan’s potential impact on the region stems from 
the fact that Japan itself is mired in a prolonged economic slump that is spilling over into 
its political and social system with unpredictable consequences. What is certain is that the 
failure of Japan’s policymakers to solve its domestic problems, and Japan’s apparent 
inability to play a more decisive regional leadership role, have sparked a major re-
assessment of the Japanese approach to political and economic governance. In short, from 
being seen as a model of effective policy implementation and rapid economic 
development, Japan is increasingly seen as a synonym for inefficiency, corruption and 
incompetence. 
 
How did this remarkable transformation come about? In part, it is clearly a function of 
Japan’s economic problems, which began in the wake of the ‘bubble economy’s’ 
collapse, and which show no signs of ending. Yet this simply begs another more 
important question: why did the model of political and economic organization that had 
underpinned Japan’s astonishing recovery from the devastation and defeat of the World 
War II suddenly seem unable to cope with the less dramatic challenges of managing a 
mature and seemingly highly successful economy? Before we explore this question, 
however, it is important to stress that for all the problems Japan may be currently 
experiencing, the rise of the Japanese economy in the last 50 years or so is a crucially 
important piece of contemporary history: not only did Japan unambiguously join the front 
rank of industrialized nations, but it provided an important role model for a number of its 
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neighbors. Consequently, trying to make sense of the rise and decline of the Japanese 
developmental model has an importance that transcends the Japanese experience; its 
widespread emulation and the scale of the Japanese economy, means its travails have 
wider pragmatic and theoretical implications. The other point to make at the outset is that 
Japan’s current problems pre-date the recent regional economic crisis. In Japan’s case the 
potential catalyst for reform has been in place for some time. Yet, the most intriguing 
thing about Japan’s reform experience is that it has not gained greater momentum over 
the last decade or so. 
 
In what follows, I shall try to explain this paradox by firstly placing the Japanese 
experience in its specific historical context. This is important, because the Japanese role 
in pioneering the developmental state raises more general questions about the historical 
circumstances under which such a model is effective. The key question which a number 
of East Asian states must confront is whether forms of governance associated with the 
developmental state are compatible with a complex highly interdependent international 
economy, or whether they must be inevitably swept aside in favour of the more market-
centred economic systems advocated by institutions like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. Having established the circumstances from which Japan’s 
distinctive post-war political-economy emerged, I consider how this highly 
institutionalised complex of political relationships and economic structures has evolved, 
and what implications this process has for reformist efforts.  
 
Despite the relatively poor performance of the Japanese economy over the last decade or 
so, and despite relentless pressure for change from outside and – to a lesser extent – from 
within Japan, it is remarkable how hesitant and slow the putative reform process has 
been, and how little of substance has actually changed. In what follows I shall suggest 
that the reform process in Japan has proved so difficult because the - formerly highly 
successful – developmental state is deeply socially embedded in a complex inter-locking 
array of institutions which are resistant to rapid change.1 Indeed, if meaningful change is 
to occur, the institutionalised residue of the developmental state will necessarily be a 
central target of reformist initiatives.  
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The Rise of the Developmental State 
 
If one concept has come to symbolise all that is distinctive about Japan’s post-war 
political-economy it is the idea of the developmental state. Originally formulated by 
Chalmers Johnson (1982), the idea of a developmental state is indicative of both the 
manner in which the role of the state is conceived, and of the sorts of internal 
relationships that constitute the state itself. On the one hand, this means that the state is 
seen as having an important and legitimate role to play in determining the course and 
content of national economic development. On the other, the developmental state is 
suggestive of a particular constellation of political and economic relations amongst the 
personnel that constitute ‘the state’. I shall consider these latter factors in more detail in 
the second part of this paper. At present, I simply want to stress that the very idea of the 
developmental state is reflective of conceptions and intellectual traditions in Japan about 
the purpose of public policy and the concomitant role of government that are 
fundamentally different from those that apply in the Anglo-American nations (Gao 1997: 
21; Fallows 1993). 
 
The genesis of the Japanese approach to public policy can be traced back the Meiji 
Restoration and the necessity of coping with  the challenge of European capitalist 
expansion. The modern Japanese nation-state was created as a means of resisting foreign 
pressure and as a direct response to ‘imperialist encroachment’ (Abe et al 1994: 5). 
Domestic change as a response to, or consequence of, external pressure has been – and 
continues to be – a significant influence on the evolution of Japan’s internal political 
relations and economic structures. Of late, as we shall see, this influence has been a good 
deal less dramatic and more subterranean than formerly. The point to emphasise here, 
however, is that the state has played a crucial and legitimate role in shaping the course of 
Japan’s recent development. Far from being an unfortunate aberration, as the 
contemporary Western fashion for small government might imply, the central and 
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powerful position of the state has been the intentional consequence of – often highly 
successful – self-consciously pursued public policy. 
 
The developmental state, then, was the post-war expression of an approach to policy-
making that had already consolidated over a considerable period. The particular 
circumstances that made a powerful and highly interventionist state continue to seem 
both appropriate and necessary were the exigencies of post-war reconstruction. 
Importantly – and despite the best efforts of the United States to mould Japan in its own 
image – much of Japan’s pre-war political and corporate infrastructure remained in tact 
and provided the basis for subsequent patterns of governance. Indeed, in many ways 
America’s reformist initiatives served to consolidate the influence and importance of an 
already powerful bureaucracy (Johnson 1982). When placed in the overarching context of 
the intensifying Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, establishing Japan as an 
effective capitalist economy and a strategic bulwark against the perceived threat of 
communist expansion was a more pressing concern than bureaucratic reform (LaFeber 
1997). The fact that such conditions no longer obtain introduces an important new 
dynamic into the evolution of Japan’s post-war political economy - one that we might 
intuitively expect to have been a profound force for change as the US can now exert 
pressure for reform freed from Cold War strategic imperatives. And yet such pressure has 
not been notably effective.  Before considering this conundrum, however, it is necessary 
to say something about the way the developmental state has been understood theoretically 
as it helps us understand its shifting theoretical and pragmatic status.  
 
Embedded autonomy 
 
To suggest that Japan’s political and economic elites were keen to re-vitalise the national 
economy in the wake of the war is hardly remarkable. If it is possible to generalise about 
public policy, the pursuit of economic growth is a fairly universal desiderata. What 
distinguished Japan, however, and what has attracted so much subsequent academic 
interest, was not simply its dramatic success in this regard, but the specific mechanisms 
that underpinned it. Significantly, precisely the same factors that were once seen as the 
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cornerstone of Japan’s rise, are now routinely invoked as the causes of its decline. At the 
centre of both the academic debates about Japanese development and of the 
developmental process itself, has been a distinctive pattern of institutionalised 
relationships between business and ‘government’. 
 
Before exploring this relationship in any detail, a couple of caveats are in order. 
‘Business’ in the context of business-government relations is essentially big business, or 
the handful of massive corporations like Mitsubishi and Mitsui and their affiliate 
companies that dominate the Japanese economy.2 ‘Government’ in this context, refers 
primarily to a number of key ministries in the state bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),  which 
have played a crucial role in guiding the course of Japan’s post-war development. 
Although government in the more conventional Western sense of a democratically 
elected political class, has played an important part in shaping the post-war Japanese 
order, it has generally been, as we shall see later,  in a much more indirect manner than in 
comparable Anglo-American economies. 
 
Rather than being considered a handicap, this configuration of political and economic 
power has been seen by a number of commentators as conferring specific advantages. 
Perhaps the most influential formulation of this thesis was Peter Evans’ suggestion that a 
number of East Asian states had – following Japan’s lead – derived specific benefits from 
a pattern of relationships he described as ‘embedded autonomy’. In essence, embedded 
autonomy provides ‘the underlying structural basis for successful state involvement in 
industrial transformation’. In this conception, embedded autonomy is in keeping with the 
ideal-typical Weberian model, in which the bureaucracy is composed of a 
technocratically competent, meritocratically determined staff, enjoying a ‘certain kind’ of 
autonomy (Evans 1995: 12). This notion of autonomy is crucial, for it is the variable 
which determines whether the bureaucracy will be able to play an effective role in 
pursuing the ‘national interest’, or whether it will become too close to those it is supposed 
to supervise. If the apparatus of the state is too distant or lacking in effective capacity, it 
will be unable too implement policy and guide the course of development in ‘appropriate’ 
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directions. If it is too close, it risks being captured by the self-serving interests of ‘rent-
seeking’ business groups. This dilemma, and the finely balanced array of economic and 
political forces that revolve around it, has been at the heart of Japan’s post-war 
developmental successes and failures. 
 
Success: Industry policy and the transformation of the Japanese economy 
 
If economic expansion is the litmus test of effective public policy, even Japan’s severest 
critics must concede that for most of the post-war period public officials can claim to 
have been spectacularly successful. Before considering Japan’s contemporary problems 
and their implications for national governance, therefore, it is important to outline the 
factors that underpinned Japan’s ‘golden age’ of successful economic management (Tabb 
1995). 
 
Despite the enormity of  the challenge that post-war reconstruction presented, Japan 
enjoyed some important advantages and some plain good fortune. Firstly, as Johnson 
(1999: 40) wryly notes, much of Japan’s success ‘depended to a large extent on losing a 
big war to the right people at the right time’. The outbreak of the Korean War gave a 
crucial boost to the devastated Japanese economy. As far as Japan’s structures of 
governance were concerned, not only did defeat and occupation ensure that Japan would 
free itself from the destructive influence of militarism, but the bureaucracy emerged with 
fewer rivals and its authority greatly enhanced. The power of the pre-war zaibatsu groups 
had been reduced and business became more dependent on the state for assistance and 
access to scarce capital. Simultaneously, the discredited political class became absorbed 
in the sort of intra-party political contestation that culminated in the Liberal Democratic 
Party’s (LDP) period of virtually unbroken post-war rule.  
 
The second important general factor that helped Japan was the advantages that flowed 
from ‘late’ developer status (Gerschenkron 1966). Yet given that all countries outside of 
Western Europe and North America were effectively late developers and thus had the 
opportunity to borrow ideas and technology from existent industrialized countries, there 
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was clearly something else going on in Japan that accounts for its remarkable 
transformation. Certainly the trauma of war-time defeat and occupation provided an 
especially powerful catalyst with which both to mobilize the population in pursuit of 
national renewal and to legitimate a prominent role for the state in this process. But it was 
the particular way that Japan organized the all important relationships between the 
bureaucracy, the political class and business that distinguished the Japanese case. Not 
only were Japan’s elite bureaucrats given the authority to plan Japan’s post-war 
development, but they also the policy instruments and mechanisms that allowed them to 
do it. 
 
To understand why Japan’s developmental state model worked so effectively, yet now 
appears unable to guide the country out of its current morass, it is necessary to say 
something about the broader political-economy of which it is a part, and the sorts of 
factors that distinguish it from its Anglo-American contemporaries. One key 
distinguishing feature of the Japanese system is the provision of credit to business 
(Zysman 1983). In the Japanese system, especially in the high-growth period during the 
1960s and ’70s, capital was primarily provided by the banks, or by recycling funds from 
Japan’s massive postal savings system, both of which were tightly regulated by the MOF. 
Consequently, the MOF enjoyed a good deal of leverage over business and a concomitant 
ability to ‘guide’ business decisions in line with its own priorities. MITI was able to 
wield similar influence over would-be exporters needing foreign exchange. In this way, 
key ministries were able to shape the course of industrial development and ensure that 
Japan developed a presence in what were taken to be strategically important industries 
(Okimoto 1989). 
 
To facilitate this process of industrial upgrading and economic expansion, elaborate 
channels of communication were established between the state and business. There is 
currently a good deal of revisionism about the continuing utility of such arrangements, 
but they are an important part of Japan’s developmental experience. One of the most 
celebrated – or reviled -  elements of this business-state apparatus was the practice of 
amakudari. Amakudari refers to the process whereby former government officials 
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‘descend from heaven’ and obtain positions on the boards of private corporations 
following their retirement from the public service. There are two quiet different ways of 
thinking about this process. 
 
At one level, amakudari can be construed as a crucial element of a sophisticated 
apparatus which allows planners in the bureaucracy to carefully monitor and respond to 
changing business conditions. It is precisely this sort of ‘infrastructural power’ that has 
been favorably contrasted with the apparent failings of Anglo-American industry policies 
by admirers of the Japanese system (Weiss and Hobson 1995). Strategically placed 
personnel, supported by a range of peak business organizations, provide a mechanism 
with which to construct and implement finely targeted policies. It should also be 
recognized that, until recently at least, the notion of public service was indicative of a 
philosophical orientation to work, as much as it was a catch-all descriptor for government 
employees. The prestige and influence  associated with a bureaucratic career 
compensated for the lack of immediate material rewards. In such a context, the lucrative 
practice of amakudari could be seen as legitimate recompense for both the modest nature 
of public service compensation and the likelihood that only a small number of any 
bureaucratic cohort would achieve the highest offices.3 
 
Failure: the institutionalization of corruption 
 
The other way of looking at amakudari in particular, and the close relationships between 
government and business more generally, of course, is to view them as the most enduring 
and entrenched examples of cronyism, collusion and self-serving, non-transparent 
practices. In this view, these sorts of institutionalized relationships are a recipe for 
encouraging corruption, as decision-making processes are not a consequence of the 
politically neutral utilization of bureaucratic expertise in the national interest, but the self-
serving and partisan consequence of favoritism and personal enrichment. There is a good 
deal of evidence to support this – very different – view of Japan’s governmental 
infrastructure.  
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The construction industry is perhaps the most notorious illustration of the way that vested 
interests have not only corrupted the process of awarding publicly funded infrastructure 
projects, but have also contributed to the development of a wider model of political and 
economic organization that has significant domestic and international costs. At one level, 
these relationships result in the - irrational at best, corrupt at worst – redistribution of 
public monies to favored building companies through the rigged dango system 
(McCormack 1996; Tilton 1994).4 Politicians are complicit in this process as the favored 
companies then support their political aspirations. At another level, however, such 
practices are part of a more generalized structural problems which, it is argued, are 
contributing to systemic failings both within Japan and in the wider international system. 
Before considering the relationship of such practices to Japan’s political system, it is 
worth making a few remarks about the possible impact such corrupt relationships have as 
they present one of the most serious challenges to the continuance of the Japanese 
system. 
 
Domestically, critics claim, the institutionalization of mutually-rewarding close 
relationships between powerful economic and political elites is a fundamental cause of 
Japan’s current malaise. What were once powerful mechanisms for industrial 
development and up-grading, have ossified into strategies for what Richard Katz (1998: 
166) calls ‘preservationism’. Rather than responding positively to competitive pressures 
and shifting market demands,  policy has been  geared ‘to preserve already existing 
sectors, to prevent unemployment, and to maintain wage equality. Market conforming 
industrial policy was replaced by market-defying industrial policy’. [Emphasis in the 
original.] The consequence, Katz argues, is a consolidation of the ‘dual economy’ in 
which an inefficient domestic sector is supported by a highly competitive export-oriented 
sector. Importantly, as far as the sustainability of this arrangement is concerned, the 
efficient sector is increasingly moving off-shore (CNN.com 2000), exacerbating Japan’s 
problems and making the underlying political and social bargains less sustainable. 
 
As Katz implies,  and as we shall see in greater detail when we consider the overtly 
political aspects of this bargain – Japan’s distinctive social accommodation, of which the 
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so-called ‘iron triangle’ is such an integral part, extends well beyond the favored elites in 
the bureaucracy, politics and business. Key social institutions like life-time employment 
and Japan’s more egalitarian patterns of wealth distribution are part of a more 
encompassing set of social arrangements; widespread change will inevitably encounter 
resistance from threatened groups. Lincoln (forthcoming) estimates that more than 50% 
of  Japanese employees have a vested interest in maintaining the existing status quo, with 
workers in agriculture, construction, and the government being particularly vulnerable, 
and – in the case of the latter group – especially well placed to frustrate reform efforts. 
The key point to emphasize here is that abstract notions of ‘economic efficiency’ are 
unlikely to impress workers whose livelihoods are directly threatened by serious reform.  
The relentless pressure to satisfy the myriad constituents of Japan’s complex growth-
oriented developmental model, means that meaningful economic reform is necessarily a 
politically difficult process. Before we examine how this dilemma has worked itself out 
in recent times, it is necessary to say something about the political process itself, and the 
way it has been imbricated with Japan’s unique governmental structures. 
 
The Japanese Political System 
 
In this section I look more closely at the structure and operation of Japan’s political 
system. The intention here is to illustrate the factors have underpinned the evolution of 
Japan’s political structures, which will inevitably  help determine the extent to which 
reform may or may not occur. In other countries where major reform has occurred, the 
political system has played a major role.  Yet one of the most striking features of the 
Japanese system is that, although it displays many of the conventional features of a 
‘developed’, industrialized liberal-democracy, its operations are highly distinctive and 
owe much to the contingent realities of Japan’s post-war political relationships. 
 
The  structure and practice of Japanese government 
 
To understand the formal operation of Japan’s contemporary political system it is useful 
to start with the reforms associated with US occupation following World War II. The 
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‘vague and ambiguous’ (Stockwin 1999: 38) Meiji Constitution was replaced with an 
American-designed document, which gave notional primacy to familiar liberal staples: 
individual rights, female emancipation, the sanctioning of labor unions, and the 
institutionalized supremacy of a civilian polity over the military. Simultaneously, the 
Emperor was stripped of his ‘divine’ status and the former House of Peers was scrapped 
and replaced – in the face of some US opposition – with a ‘House of Councilors’. The 
other element of Japan’s contemporary bicameral system is the House of Representatives, 
which has the nominal responsibility for framing budgets, approving treaties and 
appointing a prime minister. These two houses compose the National Diet and together 
constitute the ‘supreme organ of state power’ (Abe et al 1994: 15). 
 
The principle of Cabinet responsibility to the parliament was also enshrined in the new 
constitution. The intention was to reproduce a structure similar to the British model, in 
which there were ‘clear lines of responsibility and an unambiguous statement of where 
sovereignty actually lay’ (Stockwin 1999: 39). The formal structures certainly appear 
similar. The majority of Cabinet ministers must be Members of Parliament, and the prime 
minister must be similarly chosen from amongst the MPs. The MPs themselves are 
chosen by the population in regularly held competitive elections. But despite these 
apparently similar structures, the practice of Japanese politics and governance deviates in 
important ways from comparable polities amongst the industrialized nations.  
 
One of the most important differences in this regard flows from the central role of the 
bureaucracy in Japan noted above. Not only do significant numbers of  bureaucrats go 
into politics (as well as business) after leaving the public service, but they 
overwhelmingly join the LDP.5  The fact that the LDP has enjoyed a virtually unbroken 
period of office in the post-war period cements this nexus between political and 
bureaucratic power. There is another, more functional, reason why Japan’s bureaucrats 
assume such a prominent place in Japanese practices of governance, however: because of 
the prevalence of one-party rule, ministers have suffered from ‘capricious’ conditions of 
tenure and a concomitant lack of legitimacy (Abe et al 1994: 31). Intra-party competition 
and infighting has meant that politicians are preoccupied with internal party politics and 
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dependent on powerful party leaders for their continuing status. Bureaucrats, by contrast, 
have enjoyed much longer tenure, and the legitimacy that flows from area expertise. 
Ministers in particular and politicians in general have consequently become highly 
dependent on their relevant officials, to the extent that the relevant bureaucrats are 
actually responsible for framing legislation and instructing their nominal political 
superiors on the conduct of their office under the all-encompassing rubric of 
‘administrative guidance’. The overall consequence of such arrangements is a 
‘chronically weak political executive’ (Mulgan 2000: 186). 
 
Consolidating the close relations between the LDP and the bureaucracy has been the 
emergence of ‘policy tribes’ (zoku). The zoku have coalesced around specific issue areas, 
like education or defense, and represent one way in which politicians have attempted to 
develop their own policy expertise in specific areas, leading to the development of a 
symbiotic relationship between the various actors that try to shape public policy. 
Although the representation of specific interests might be considered one of the hallmarks 
of democratic pluralism, it should be noted that even this apparent exemplar of 
conventional ‘Western’ political behavior takes on specific indigenous characteristics and 
is emblematic of a more generalized pattern of Japanese particularism. The zoku used 
their pivotal position between the private sector and the bureaucracy to seek bribes from 
businesses attempting to circumvent restrictive regulations. Moreover, the zoku were able 
to establish a power base in the LDP’s influential Policy Affairs Research Council from 
which to mould bureaucratic initiatives to their own benefit (Johnson 1995: 214-15).  
Consequently, rather than being seen as a healthy expression of democratic competition 
the zoku are generally seen as ‘unmitigated evils’ (Curtis 1999: 53). To understand their 
role more fully, we need to look more closely at the more overtly political aspects of the 
Japanese system. 
 
Japanese politics 
 
Although Japanese politics shares many of the same formal qualities of comparable 
polities in Britain, America or Australia, in practice it is vastly different. Much of the 
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distinctiveness of both Japanese politics and the symbiotic relationship that Japan’s 
political class has established with the bureaucracy can be explained by the LDP’s 
dominance in the post-war war period. From its inception in 1955, the LDP has enjoyed 
an extended period of office, broken only briefly by a number of unwieldy, largely 
unsuccessful  coalition governments in the mid 1990s, which were plagued by scandals, 
incompetence and – in the case of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) alliance with the 
LDP – a sense of cynical political opportunism (Otake 2000). Throughout the rest of the 
post-war period, real political power - and the most important political contestation - was 
concentrated within the LDP. The dominance of the LDP meant that the notional political 
opposition was often more ritualistic than real: political protest and opposition at the 
height of LDP power was routinized  as even non-LDP parties were incorporated into an 
overarching framework of LDP hegemony. 
 
Because so much of the most important  political maneuvering and jockeying for power 
has occurred within the LDP, rather than between rival political parties, faction leaders 
within the LDP continue to play a crucial role. Although the factions have become fewer, 
more complex and less associated with a particular leader, the assignment of cabinet and 
key party posts is still largely determined by political contestation and negotiation within 
the LDP. Although the recent election of Junichiro Koizumi as leader of the LDP and 
thus prime minister is a remarkable expression of popular opinion by the LDP’s general 
membership, it remains to be seen whether he will be able to overturn the entrenched 
power of the LDP’s factions. Although Koizumi’s first cabinet contained some new 
faces, it was hardly revolutionary or lacking in factional representatives (Economist May 
5: 23). 
 
While it is plainly too soon to judge how significant recent events will prove to be, the 
challenge will be to overthrow what the LDP’s ‘machine politics’. In this conception, 
machine politics refers to a: 
 
non-ideological organization interested less in political principle than in securing and 
holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work for it. It 
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relies on what it accomplishes in a concrete way for its supporters, not on what it stands 
for. A machine may, in fact, be likened to a business in which all members are stockholders 
and where dividends are paid in accordance with what has been invested (Scott 1970: 551). 
 
The evolution of Japanese politics along these lines can be attributed to a couple of key 
factors. Kakuei Tanaka6 was responsible for welding the various elements of the Japanese 
system – the voters, the political parties, the bureaucracy and business – into what he 
himself called a ‘conveyor belt of money and power’ (cited in Schlesinger 1999: 95). At 
the center of Tanaka’s power and the system he helped establish was his personal faction 
or clique (gundan), which was intent on ruthlessly expanding its size, influence and place 
at the center of Japanese politics. Although Tanaka lost the position of Prime Minister 
after becoming embroiled in the so-called ‘Lockheed scandal’ in 1976, he actually 
became more powerful after this, and certainly more powerful than the ‘hapless series of 
men who succeeded him in the job [as Prime Minister], whom he virtually hired and 
controlled at will’ (Schlesinger 1999: 94). In other words, real power lay not with the 
formal head of government, but with the shadowy factions that determined who would be 
nominated for what was little more than a ceremonial role.  
 
The complex nature of Japan’s electoral system has meant that meaningful political 
contestation  often occurs between members of the same party.7 In such circumstances, 
the ability to curry favor with prospective voters by delivering gifts or political largesse 
has been  a crucial part and explanation of Japan’s notorious ‘money politics’. Without 
access to large amounts of cash and favors of precisely the sort that the Tanaka machine 
could deliver, MPs might find themselves unable to maintain their positions. The 
necessity for continuous injections of huge amounts of money to lubricate the system 
helps explain why Tanaka’s gundan became prominent members of the policy tribes 
associated with industries that provided the biggest donations to political parties and the  
largest blocs of votes, especially telecommunications, postal affairs, transportation, health 
and welfare, commerce, and industry. In the most important source of funding of all – 
construction – two thirds of the zoku were members of Tanaka's faction (Schlesinger 
1999: 140). 
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The other factor to stress in explaining the rise of Japan’s machine politics is the external 
environment in which such relationships evolved. Cocooned within the pervasive and 
protective embrace of America’s Cold War hegemony, Japanese politics was  
 
…freed from the normal difficult choices and ideological divides of democracy. 
Leadership became a relatively easy matter of distributing seemingly limitless wealth as 
widely as possible, of building an extensive, diverse coalition…As long as enough 
constituencies were taken care of, as long as no sector or interest group was seriously 
angered or alienated, the majority of the electorate was willing to overlook some unsavory 
shenanigans, including the cynical separation of de facto and de jure authority, and a 
degree of overt political corruption that would probably be considered intolerable in other 
developed nations (Schlesinger 1999: 231). 
 
Relationships that might have been considered collusive and corrupt in other places have 
not only been  commonplace and widely tolerated in Japan, but they have extended 
widely throughout Japanese society; one of the reason’s the Tanaka-style political 
machine was able to establish itself so effectively was precisely because it could deliver 
tangible benefits to targeted electorates. Consequently, as Gibney (2000:84) observes, 
‘the threshold of political indignation in Japan is unbelievably high’. 
 
Crucially, therefore, there has been no political constituency in Japan to champion the 
sort of governmental reforms and ‘downsizing’ that has become such a feature of 
comparable Anglo-American polities. As Gerald Curtis (1999: 39) points out, ‘the 
minority of political leaders who advocated fundamental, drastic political economic 
changes were not reflecting public opinion’. Unsurprisingly, they have consequently 
made little impact on public debates as a consequence.8 In countries like Britain and the 
US there may also have been little public enthusiasm for thoroughgoing public sector 
reform, but such reforms were imposed by powerful political elites convinced of their 
necessity or utility (Gray 1999; Ikeneberry 1990). In Japan, by contrast, not only is there 
no comparable political class with the capacity to push through potentially unpopular 
reforms, but there are so many existing vested interests and beneficiaries from the 
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existent system, that meaningful reform remains an imposing political and technical 
challenge. 
 
The Politics of Regulatory Reform 
 
In this section I examine the way the reform process has unfolded in the specific 
circumstances of Japan’s post-war political economy. I suggest that it is simply not 
possible to understand reformist initiatives in isolation, and that such developments need 
to placed in a wider political and economic context.  
 
Political reform 
 
The first point to make about Japan’s attempts at political reform is that the results have 
been inconclusive and contradictory. Certainly, the breaking of the LDP’s stranglehold 
on power during the mid 1990s was a noteworthy development, but it also needs to be 
acknowledged that the subsequent reinstallation of the LDP marked something of a return 
to ‘business as usual’;  most of Japan’s subsequent leaders – Hata, Murayama, 
Hashimoto, and Obuchi – have had close links to the machine politics that emerged in the 
Tanaka era. Even the hapless and gaffe-prone Yoshiro Mori was a product of, and 
dependent on, the factional loyalty of rival groups within the LDP, something that 
inevitably complicated the reform process and undermined what little authoroty he had 
before losing office (Sprague and Murakami 2000). The close, symbiotic links between 
Japan’s machine politics and other agencies of government limits the prospects and 
momentum for wholesale administrative reforms. As noted above, despite the fact that  
Koizumi was recently elected in the apparent belief that he could transform Japanese 
politics, he too remains constrained by factional loyalties (Daily Yomiuri April 25). 
 
Yet, it is also important to recognize that the circumstances in which Japanese politics are 
played out have changed considerably. The seemingly interminable economic downturn 
that followed the collapse of the bubble economy at the beginning of the 1990s is 
undermining  the basis of Japan’s machine politics. Japan’s politicians and bureaucrats 
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have suffered a loss of legitimacy and credibility as a consequence of the prolonged 
slump. Moreover, conflicts over distributional questions have been brought into sharper 
focus as a consequence, highlighting divisions between the internationally competitive 
and moribund sectors of the Japanese economy, and leading seasoned  observers to 
suggest that subsequent major change in Japan’s postwar regime is ‘irreversible’ (Pempel 
1998: 212). Certainly, some fundamental components of the old order appear 
unsustainable and less effective. The traditional recourse to pump-priming is placing 
increased pressure on Japan’s deteriorating budgetary position,9  forcing a reduction in 
the scale of public works project spending (Yamaguchi 2000). At the same time, there is 
mounting public opposition to the purposes to which such monies are put. Not only does 
the traditional strategy of funneling money to well connected cronies in the construction 
sector attract increased public criticism (Dawson 2000), but such a strategy appears 
incapable of lifting Japan out of its economic doldrums. 
 
Japan’s political elite has come under sustained external pressure to initiate reforms that 
will both open up its domestic market and overcome the supposed shortcomings of its 
national regulatory structure. Although there are limits to what foreign pressure (gaiatsu) 
can achieve in the absence of a sympathetic domestic constituency actively working 
toward the same ends (Schoppa 1997), nevertheless, Japan’s reform efforts -  even if 
partial, grudging and incomplete - have had an important affect on the constellation of 
relationships and practices associated with machine politics. The liberalization of the 
financial sector, for example, has had a major impact on the way Japanese companies 
raise capital, and a led to a concomitant diminution of bureaucratic power as a 
consequence. Because Japanese corporations can now raise money in international 
financial markets, they are no longer dependent on the good graces of officials in the 
MOF or MITI for access to capital, and these agencies have experienced a decline in their 
influence as a consequence (Leyshon 1994; Calder 1997). 
 
Given this confluence of external political pressures, long-term structural changes within 
Japan’s domestic political-economy, and a more generalized ideational shift at the  
international level toward policies centered on deregulation and smaller government, it 
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might be expected that reform within Japan would have gathered an irresistible 
momentum. The reality is more complex. 
 
Administrative reform 
 
The idea that ‘deregulation’ necessarily involves an absence or even a major reduction of 
regulation has always been a misconception. Complex forms of economic organization 
rely upon a structure of regulations to coordinate the actions of actors and give 
predictability and confidence about the conduct of social relationships – the essence of 
any form of capitalism. It is, therefore,  more accurate to talk about re-regulation than de-
regulation (Cerny 1991). In Japan’s case, this basic insight has been exemplified and 
amplified by the actions of bureaucrats in response to the reformist pressures described 
above.  
 
One of the key differences that has determined the way reform has been undertaken in 
Japan is a basic difference in philosophy and orientation. Whereas in the Anglo-
American countries the prevailing political rationality has encouraged policymakers to 
move toward a market-enhancing, small government regulatory framework, in Japan 
historical pre-conditions encourage continuing state involvement in the coordination of 
economic processes (Beeson 1999). Steven Vogel (1996: 59) describes these basic 
differences in orientation as ‘pro-competitive disengagement’ and ‘strategic 
reinforcement’ – the latter describing the way Japan has undertaken reform. The key 
consequence is that in Japan the liberalization process has been managed by government, 
in a process that has ‘resisted any devolution of regulatory power [and] protected 
ministerial discretion’ (Vogel 1996: 59). In other words, Vogel contends, although Japan 
may have freer markets it also has new regulations that do not necessarily undermine 
government control and which may even enhance it.  
 
One of the most telling illustrations of this paradox has occurred in the area of financial 
sector reform. Japan’s ‘big bang’ was supposed to replicate Britain’s and inaugurate a 
new, market-driven order in which government played a less prominent role. In  practice, 
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little tangible change has occurred.10 While the MOF has embraced the rhetoric of 
reform, it is less enthusiastic about the practice, especially in the wake of Japan’s earlier 
liberalization experience and the subsequent disasters of the bubble economy years 
(Lincoln 1998). Murphy (2000) argues that the MOF believes that Japan’s private sector 
simply lacks the expertise to run a fully deregulated financial sector, making it reluctant 
to relinquish control. The most revealing and tangible outcome of the MOF’s reform 
efforts has actually been an increase in the number of regulations that govern the 
financial sector (Choy 1997). 
 
This difference between rhetoric and reality is symptomatic of a more general approach 
to administrative reform in Japan. Attempts to reform Japan’s administrative practices 
and address emerging fiscal problems began in the early 1980s, but have foundered as a 
consequence of the inadequate political and public support noted above, or because of 
sheer bureaucratic inertia. Even during the brief life of Morihiro Hosokawa’s 
government, which actually excluded the LDP and which was consequently expected to 
break the grip of machine politics, serious reform was rendered less likely because the 
various bureaucratic agencies themselves were given the responsibility of deciding what 
form any initiatives should take and what areas should actually be reformed (Carlile 
1998: 96). One of the great ironies of the five year reform effort, which was intended to 
culminate in early 2001 with a radical pruning of bureaucratic ranks, is that some 
ministries have actually asked for more staff to cope with the new administrative tasks 
involved! Likewise, a scheme to attract outsiders from the private sector to oversee 
reform processes has failed to attract adequate numbers  of new recruits (Hau 2000). 
 
The various reform blueprints that have emerged from the bureaucracy appear to be 
designed to make Japan’s political system more effective and accountable, and to make 
the bureaucracy more efficient and stream-lined (see Administrative Reform Council 
1997). The importance and influence of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister are to be 
enhanced, and apparently major changes to the structure and organization of the 
bureaucracy as a whole are proposed. The real impact of these reforms is more 
questionable, however. True, the number of agencies and ministries is to be reduced from 
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23 to 13, with a similar reduction in the size of the Cabinet from 22 ministers to 17. 
Similarly, over the next decade the reform process is intended to reduce the size of the 
bureaucratic workforce by about one-quarter from its current 540,000 (Mogi 2001). 
There has also been some reorganization of the structure of the bureaucracy, with 
established agencies like the Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications actually 
disappearing into an new General Affairs Ministry, and the powerful MOF being re-
badged as the Ministry of the Treasury. And yet informed observers like Ed Lincoln 
(forthcoming, ch. 4) claim that such efforts are ‘nothing more than a rearrangement of the 
organizational diagram for government’. Indeed, such reforms may actually entrench 
some of the corrupt practices they are intended to curb because, as Lincoln points out, the 
New Ministry of National Land Development, which contains all the key public works 
agencies including the notorious former Ministry of Construction, will mean that 
‘politicians will have a one-stop location for pork’. 
 
Thus, despite a number of commissions and reform initiatives dating back the celebrated 
Maekawa report in 1986, little meaningful change has occurred in the operation or 
organization of Japan’s administrative apparatus or the complex relationships that 
constitute it. Even where limited reforms have occurred, they have been concentrated in 
the politically weaker agencies, which lack a powerful zoku to protect and promote their 
interests in the fierce inter-agency rivalries that are such a feature of the Japanese 
bureaucracy.11 Although the intention of the latest round of governmental  reforms -  
streamlining the bureaucracy and giving greater power to elected politicians - may please 
critics of ‘Japan Inc’, the history of previous reform initiatives suggests that the major 
disjuncture between rhetoric and reality is likely to continue. Even where some 
administrative responsibilities may have been shifted from central to local governments 
in line with a policy of decentralization, power and control have remained with the 
center. Crucially, local governments remain financially dependent on the center, meaning 
that ‘the center’s tight financial control over local governments … provide[s] the 
structure that is largely responsible for the corruption that ‘reform’ measures are, at least 
rhetorically, to clean out’ (Jain 2001: 20).  Thus, the reform process in Japan has largely 
been superficial and has had surprisingly little impact on many of the underlying 
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structures of the former developmental state. Although the purpose and efficacy of the 
developmental state may have been undermined, its continuing institutional legacy 
continues to exert a significant influence on political and economic outcomes.  
 
Although the Meiji Restoration and the remarkable recovery from the devastation from 
World War 2 remind us that Japan can rapidly transform itself when necessary, there is 
no reason to suppose that the current situation will change quickly. It is important to 
remember that for all Japan’s supposed troubles, the vast majority of people have jobs 
and the economy continues to grow – albeit far more slowly than in the developmental 
state’s halcyon days. Consequently, most people still have a stake in the existing order. 
Under such circumstances change is likely to be slow and the reform process more 
gradual than some observers may hope or expect. 
 
The Reluctant Reform Process: Implications and Prospects 
 
Japan pioneered a distinctive, state-led  model of economic development that has been 
highly successful and influential, especially in East Asia. And yet the very success of this 
model and the constellation of interests that coalesced around it as a consequence, have 
made subsequent reform difficult. Given Japan’s significance in the East Asian region 
and in the wider global economy, the fate of the developmental state model and the 
prospects for reform are issues of major importance, and not just for Japan. Japan’s sheer 
economic weight means that unless it is able to address some of its increasingly acute 
domestic economic problems, and play a more constructive and cooperative role in the 
wider international system, it has the potential to exert a negative influence on the general 
international economic system.12 While it may be rash to make predictions about a 
country and a politico-economic system that has demonstrated both resilience and – in 
the more distant past - a remarkable capacity for revolutionary re-invention, there are a 
number of important points that emerge from Japan’s recent political and economic 
history which merit emphasis. 
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Firstly, it should be remembered that Japan’s economic development was most dynamic, 
and its distinctive social accommodation was most entrenched, at precisely the same time 
that Japan’s politics were most machine-like and ‘corrupt’. In other words, we need to 
recognize that corruption can have important functional qualities (Nye 1970); the 
Japanese case reminds us that there is no simple link between the existence of corruption 
per se and economic performance. This is important given that Japan’s recent economic 
difficulties and the presence of wide-spread corruption are often cited as reasons for 
reform. Japan’s history, however, suggests that not only is there no simple causal 
relationship between corruption and poor economic performance, but its elimination - 
supposing such a thing to be possible – will not inevitably guarantee improved economic 
outcomes. In the context of the current economic malaise the principal significance of 
widespread corruption is that it makes reform that much more difficult: no matter how 
self-serving, venal or inefficient elements of Japan’s political-economy may be, they will 
be difficult to transform while they continue to deliver benefits to powerful stakeholders. 
In other words, it is not necessarily corruption itself that is the central problem, but the 
increasingly ineffective network of relationships it helps perpetuate. 
 
 This is an especially important consideration given that the economic structure that 
underpinned the developmental state at the height of its effectiveness – especially the 
creation of a highly protected domestic sector – has plainly become increasingly 
uncompetitive. Despite the fact that this is increasingly recognized even within Japan, 
and the existence of apparently genuine pressure from some sections of business in 
support of reform (see Keidanren 2000), the entrenched, socially embedded nature of the 
relationships that constitute Japan’s political-economy make systematic restructuring and 
reform inherently problematic – no mater how dysfunctional the system may have 
become. Some of Japan’s potential strengths – its high levels of domestic savings and its 
capacity for Keynesian-style stimulatory policies – are consequently wasted as potentially 
valuable resources are diverted to politically well-connected businesses to squander on 
pointless public works projects, rather than being used to generate more productive and 
wide-spread demand. 
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Secondly, there are other, possibly more fundamental consequences that flow from the 
persistence of an unreformed state as far as Japan’s future developmental prospects are 
concerned. One of the great strengths of the developmental state in its early years was its 
capacity to coordinate and encourage specific forms of industrial development and ensure 
that Japan ‘caught up’ with the leading industrialized countries. However, it has been 
persuasively argued that the nature of contemporary technological innovation is simply 
not responsive to the sorts highly interventionist, state-directed strategies employed by 
generations of Japanese planners (Fong 1998). Contemporary advances at the 
technological frontier of the most strategically important,  wealth-generating industries 
are, it appears, more likely to occur in the sorts of diffuse networks of independent 
producers found in Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1994), than they are in the sort of highly 
centralized projects favored by the Japanese government (Drezner 2001). This is an 
especially important consideration given that, on the one hand,  success in such industries 
has been a fundamental part of the remarkable post-war transformation that propelled 
Japan to the forefront of the industrialized economies, and on the other, that 
decentralization policies have been a central component of the proposed package of 
reforms designed to lift Japan out of its present difficulties. In reality, the decentralization 
initiative, which was intended to hand greater control to local governments, has been 
thwarted by the reluctance of the central government to relinquish power and transfer 
necessary resources (Stockwin 1999: 43; MacIntyre 2000). If the claimed link between 
technological innovation, business dynamism and governmental structure proves robust, 
then the desirability of meaningful reform becomes even more compelling. 
 
Although much of the reformist discourse directed at countries like Japan that emerges 
from institutions like the IMF and countries like the US has a strong normative 
component (Scott this volume), some forms of governance are clearly more effective than 
others (Beeson forthcoming b). The apparent inability of Japan’s political and 
bureaucratic elites to implement meaningful reform in a system that is plainly not as 
effective, or perhaps as appropriate, as it once was has a number of important 
interconnected consequences. In the short term, it makes it difficult to persuade an 
increasingly apathetic and cynical public to help revitalize the economy through domestic 
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spending. In the longer-term, however, the competitive position of Japanese industry is 
threatened as Japan itself becomes a less attractive place to develop or run an 
internationally competitive business. The former strengths and dominant position 
developed by Japanese corporations during the heyday of developmental state has meant 
that Japan’s ruling elites have been able to muddle through for a decade or more of 
economic decline without having to fundamentally change the old system.  Yet, at a time 
when an editorial in one of Japan’s leading papers, the Yomori Shimbun,  suggests that 
Japan is ‘drifting towards degeneration’ and gripped by ‘an indescribable sense of 
helplessness and gridlock’,13 and when finance minister Kiichi Miyazawa declares that 
the nation’s finances are ‘close to collapse’ (BBC 2001), then even the old constellation 
of interests that was so central to the developmental state and which has proved so 
difficult to reform, may finally be shattered by the combined effects of economic 
stagnation and political paralysis. 
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Endnotes 
1 For a more detailed explanation of the way in which institutions may make reform 
difficult, see  (Beeson forthcoming a). 
2 Recently, there has been a major consolidation of Japan’s corporate sector, reducing the 
overall number of the massive corporate groups that dominate the Japanese economy 
from 6 to 4. However, as the Economist dolefully noted, although there are major 
pressures on the keiretsu, this does not mean that they are a spent force or that their 
distinctive business practices and political influence will necessarily disappear. See The 
Economist, November 25, 2000: 86. 
3 Japan’s pervasive social and bureaucratic mores mean that members of the same 
graduate intake are promoted at the same rate. As the number of promotion slots 
decreases, members of the same ‘vintage’ are encouraged into private industry or politics 
– to enjoy a second career and continue acting as crucial conduits for policy 
implementation. (See Schaede 1995). 
4 The dango system refers to the officially sanctioned cartels that are allocated lucrative 
public works contracts by the Ministry of Construction. This system of non-competitive 
tendering is a crucial element of a system which sees all the key players in business, 
politics and the bureaucracy receiving direct benefits. 
5 In the late 1960s, more than a quarter of lower house LDP MPs were former bureaucrats 
(Stockwin 1999: 96), although this number has declined signficantly of late to around 13 
per cent. 
6 In what follows I follow the Western, rather than the Japanese convention, and place 
family names last. 
7 Japan’s electoral system has traditionally been based on multi-member districts in 
which politicians from the same party compete with each other for a share of votes for 
their party. Consequently, MPs were often preoccupied with internal part struggles and 
the raising of money to win crucial electoral support. The introduction of a number of 
single-member districts was supposed reduce the necessity for money politics and 
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encourage greater pluralism. The results have been less than advocates hoped, however. 
See Stockwin (1997). 
8 Where liberalization has been effective it has generally been because a combination of 
outside and internal pressure has combined to bring about change. When MITI assisted 
the US to bring about change in Japan’s restrictive auto-inspection procedures this 
facilitated US parts imports despite the objections of Japan’s Ministry of Transportation. 
See Schoppa (1997: 273-74). 
9 Japan has poured an estimated ¥35 trillion (US$325 billion) into public spending 
projects in an effort to revitalize the economy, leading to a significant increase in the 
budget deficit. (See The Economist, 5.2000: 23). 
10 See The Economist, April 1, 2000: 67/8. 
11 Hashimoto’s apparently genuine attempts to impose change on a number of ministries 
were fended off by powerful agencies like the Ministry of Construction with the help of 
their respective zoku. See Mishima (1998). 
12 Constraints of space preclude a detailed consideration of Japan’s mercantilist trade and 
industry policies and their impact on the world economy, but for an illuminating 
discussion, see Brenner (1998). 
 
13 Cited in Lunn (2001). 
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